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Industrial hygiene specialists from the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) visit-
ed hospitals and medical centers throughout Taiwan. They
assisted with designing and evaluating ventilation modifica-
tions for infection control, developed guidelines for convert-
ing hospital rooms into SARS patient isolation rooms,
prepared designs for the rapid conversion of a vacated mil-
itary facility into a SARS screening and observation facility,
assessed environmental aspects of dedicated SARS hospi-
tals, and worked in concert with the Taiwanese to develop
hospital ventilation guidelines. We describe the environ-
mental findings and observations from this response,
including the rapid reconfiguration of medical facilities dur-
ing a national health emergency, and discuss environmen-
tal challenges should SARS or a SARS-like virus emerge
again.
T
he outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) placed unprecedented demands on healthcare
practitioners, healthcare institutions, and public works per-
sonnel worldwide. Taiwan reported the third largest num-
ber of SARS infections and deaths, followed by Hong
Kong and mainland China (1). At the request of the Taiwan
Department of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) sent staff to Taiwan that included epi-
demiologists, infectious disease experts, and environmen-
tal and logistical specialists. Industrial hygienists were
requested to investigate and help develop guidance for
hospitals about patient isolation rooms, personal protective
equipment, general infection control, and hospital health
and safety. 
From April 29, 2003, through June 13, 2003, four
industrial hygienists from the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducted envi-
ronmental assessments of 32 hospitals and medical centers
throughout Taiwan. NIOSH staff were deployed serially (a
team of two initially and later, two persons at two different
times) within larger teams stationed first in Taipei and then
in Kaohsiung. CDC personnel worked together with
Taiwanese scientists from the Taiwan Department of
Health (DOH), Taiwan Center for Disease Control,
National Taiwan University, College of Public Health
(NTUCPH), and the Taiwan Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health (Taiwan IOSH). During the peak of the
SARS epidemic, CDC environmental support focused on
immediate steps to isolate SARS patients, protect health-
care workers and other personnel during fever screening
and patient care, and provide advice on disinfection, direct
contact, and airborne precautions. As the epidemic waned,
efforts turned to assessing the implementation of infection
control practices, strategies for handling future SARS
patients, facility designs for effective patient isolation and
fever screening stations, personal protective equipment
practices, and training of healthcare workers. Thirty-two
hospitals or medical centers that were either accepting and
treating SARS patients or were under consideration for use
as dedicated SARS treatment facilities in anticipation of a
more widely disseminated epidemic were visited.
We describe an uncharacteristic industrial hygiene and
public health response that occurred under conditions of a
national health emergency. The circumstances, an evolving
epidemic occurring in a worldwide atmosphere of tremen-
dous uncertainty, elicited a unique response, which went
beyond the traditional industrial hygiene investigative
model. The requirement that the response teams deploy to
the field on short notice, swiftly conduct multiple site
investigations, and provide expedient recommendations on
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increased the challenges of this assignment. Although
environmental findings and observations from hospital site
visits and the rapid reconfiguration of medical facilities
into dedicated SARS patient facilities are described, they
are not necessarily prescriptive. Global health emergencies
demand quick action, which was the case for the SARS
epidemic. We describe the environmental challenges that
could occur should SARS or a SARS-like virus emerge
again. Prescriptive environmental guidelines are available
elsewhere (2). Comprehensive ventilation engineering or
facility evaluations of every hospital or healthcare facility
were not possible to obtain. 
Chronology and Methods 
Two staff members arrived April 29, 2003, and met
with CDC team members to coordinate response roles.
Meetings were arranged with Taiwanese government offi-
cials and scientists, including Taiwan DOH, Taiwan
Centers for Disease Control, NTUCPH, and Taiwan IOSH.
The need was agreed on for controls to isolate SARS
patients and ensure protection of healthcare workers and
other personnel exposed to patients suspected or known to
be infected with SARS. A four-phase environmental
approach was developed, which included the following:
1) conduct environmental needs assessments for health-
care facilities; 2) conduct environmental field assessments
for healthcare facilities; 3) develop written environmental
guidelines for healthcare facilities; and 4) conduct envi-
ronmental audits of selected healthcare facilities.
Environmental Needs Assessment for 
Healthcare Facilities 
In collaboration with Taiwanese scientists, a needs
assessment for healthcare facilities was conducted to
understand the most important environmental issues for
controlling the spread of SARS in hospitals. Additional
airborne infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) were needed on
a temporary and a permanent basis. Developing environ-
mental guidelines for design and evaluation of such rooms
was a priority. Training healthcare workers in appropriate
use of personal protective equipment and infection control
practices was also an immediate need at the hospital level.
Environmental Field Assessments of 
Healthcare Facilities 
Field assessments of healthcare facilities were conduct-
ed to better understand standard design and ventilation
parameters and how existing AIIRS were configured. The
Taiwan Center for Disease Control selected the facilities to
represent a cross-section of national, municipal, military,
and private hospitals. Environmental field teams typically
included NIOSH specialists, a Taiwan Center for Disease
Control physician, an occupational health specialist, a
Taiwan IOSH engineer, and a doctoral student from
NTUCPH. Discussions were held with senior hospital
management to understand general hospital configura-
tions, total patient and AIIR capacity, infection control
practices, and to determine if SARS patients were being
treated at the facility. Ventilation designs were discussed
with facilities staff, ventilation drawings were reviewed,
and AIIRS, if present, were observed. Discussions with
staff during the site visit allowed the team to evaluate envi-
ronmental issues regarding the expedient addition of isola-
tion rooms, issues affecting infection control, and the
selection and use of appropriate personal protective equip-
ment. Table 1 describes the first 10 hospitals and 2 fever
clinics that were visited from April 29, 2003, through May
13, 2003, in and around Taipei and Kaoshiung, Taiwan.
Environmental Guidelines for Healthcare Facilities 
A Taiwan IOSH engineer, 27 Taiwanese public health
and ventilation specialists, and a NIOSH industrial
hygiene specialists developed Guidelines for the Integrity
and Inspection of SARS Isolation Wards. The information
was to be used to construct permanent infrastructure and
included the appropriate layout of a SARS treatment room
and ward, ventilation design for sufficient negative pres-
sure in AIIRs, and filtration and treatment of exhausted air.
This document also included measures to enhance infec-
tion control and protect healthcare workers during mainte-
nance of the isolation room and ventilation system. The
document was written in Chinese and was posted on Web
sites of the Taiwan Center for Disease Control and IOSH
and distributed to healthcare facilities (http://www.iosh.
gov.tw/eversion/sarse.htm). The Taiwan Center for
Disease Control also used this document in training ses-
sions for healthcare managers and workers throughout
Taiwan.
Because of an immediate need for simple ventilation
modifications to reconfigure existing patient rooms to
serve as AIIRs, NIOSH staff developed a list of possible
modifications to create and confirm negative pressure in
typical patient rooms. Applications varied by facility and
included increasing exhaust air volume with the addition
of assist fans, ways to reduce room leakage and confirm
negative pressure, such as using flutter strips on doors or
pressure gauges on walls. More complex modifications
that used self-contained air exchange, HEPAfiltration, and
ventilation units were also included.
Environmental Audits of Selected Healthcare Facilities 
Audits evaluated how well the SARS isolation ward
guidelines had been implemented. Hospital managers were
contacted, and walkthrough surveys were arranged for
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adequacy of AIIRs, provide guidance for construction or
conversion of existing patient rooms into AIIRs, provide
technical assistance on ventilation and other controls (e.g.,
isolation, procedures, and training), evaluate appropriate
use of personal protective equipment, and provide guid-
ance on various environmental considerations for infection
control.
Kaohsiung County, Tainan, and Chai-Yi 
Twelve hospitals and medical centers in southern
Taiwan were visited May 17–25, 2003. Meetings were
held with facilities and ventilation engineers, hospital
administrators, and medical and nursing staff to under-
stand the number, type, and location of AIIRs. Mechanical
drawings, blueprints, and ventilation testing reports were
reviewed, and walkthrough surveys were conducted.
Visible smoke testing was performed to evaluate pressur-
ization between nurses’stations and SARS patients’wards
and for as many individual patient rooms as possible.
When possible, air handling units, HEPAfilters, outside air
intakes, and rooftop exhaust ductwork were inspected.
Infection control procedures and personal protective
equipment use were reviewed, including availability, staff
knowledge regarding proper use, and implementation. 
Standard versus simple negative-pressure isolation
rooms were observed. Typically, standard isolation rooms
had an anteroom for use by healthcare workers to put on
and take off personal protective equipment, a digital or
analog pressure manometer mounted outside the door, hard
rather than suspended ceilings, and walls that extended
floor-to-ceiling. Headwall and utility penetrations were
sealed to reduce leakage, maintain negative pressure, and
control airflow. Constant volume air-handling units were
commonly used and configured to operate in the single
pass mode. Most air-handling units could be tested and
balanced to maintain negative pressure of 2.5 to 20 pascal
(0.008–0.08 inches of water). Exhaust for standard AIIRs
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Table 1. Environmental findings from hospitals and medical centers in Taipei, Taiwan
a,b 
Hospitals   IRs 
Single pass 
AHU  HEPA  UV 
Pressure 
monitors 
BP 
review  Comments 
T-1  10
c 
27
d 
N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Medical center (largest healthcare facility category in 
Taiwan). Affiliated with Taiwan University School of 
Public Health. Two visits made by CDC team. 
T-2  9
c 
3
d 
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Two visits made by CDC team. Three IRs were 
constructed within 1 week for the ER. 
T-3  0 
 
Y  Y  N  N  Y  No IRs. Instead windows in SARS patient rooms kept 
open. Suggested closing windows and adjusting 
thermostat and fan settings in patient rooms to 
increase negative pressure. 
T-4  12
c 
12
c 
Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Suburban hospital, scheduled to receive SARS 
patients. 
T-5  108–120
d  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Under conversion to a designated SARS hospital. 
T-6  1
c 
6
d 
Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Rural hospital approximately 2 hours from Taipei City. 
T-7  10
d  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Suburban hospital where non-SARS patients from Ho-
Ping Hospital (facility closed during the SARS 
outbreak) would be transferred. 
T-8  56
d  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Medical center with entire building being converted to 
a SARS wing. 
T-9  77
d  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Formerly closed military hospital, this facility was 
under conversion to designated SARS hospital. 
T-10   77
d  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Medical center and only private hospital of the group 
visited. The newly installed single-pass ventilation 
system with HEPA/UV filtration was excellent. 
Fever 
clinics 
e  Y 
e 
e  Y  N  Under construction in paved parking areas adjacent to 
the hospital. 
aAll hospitals listed strongly suggested (or required) wearing filtering face-piece respirators when entering the hospital. Persons entering these facilities 
were screened for fever before entering the facility (using infrared skin or tympanic membrane sensors) and dispensed sanitizing gels or disposable hand-
cleaning wipes. 
bIRs, isolation rooms; AHU, air handling units; HEPA, high efficiency particle aerosol; UV, ultraviolet germicidal irradiation lamps; BP, blue print or engineering 
designs plans available for review; Y, yes; N, no; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
cIRs available during initial visit (numbers include IRs in all areas of the hospital). 
dIRs planned for completion (within weeks). 
eIRs planned ranged from 2 to 6 per location. Ventilation in IRs ranged from simple (standard bathroom exhaust fans, without HEPA or UV treatment of 
exhaust air) to well-designed single-pass exhaust air systems with HEPA/UV treatment of exhaust air. No IRs present at time of visit. Hospital used 
standard patient rooms for SARS patients, providing 100% supply air, with exterior windows remaining open. Pressure differentials between patient rooms 
and remainder of floor where minimal hospital evaluation not possible. Determination made on the number or adequacy of IRs available. The NIOSH/CDC 
team recommended that this hospital not be used for SARS patients based on lack of information regarding ventilation system. Fever clinics included 
tented areas or small buildings (generally under construction) outside hospital ERs used to screen for fever and other symptoms to identify possible 
SARS-infected patients before entering the hospital. were often configured with HEPA filtration. Some facili-
ties installed ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI)
lamps in HEPA filter banks, although the efficacy of using
UVGI for control of SARS-associated coronavirus was
uncertain.
Most of the simple isolation rooms had been designed
for isolating patients with infectious diseases such as sca-
bies. These rooms lacked an anteroom, generally had win-
dow-mounted air-conditioning units, and small
(1,000–2,000 ft3/min) window-mounted vane axial fans
for negative pressure. Wall penetrations were typically not
sealed, manometers were generally not present, and ceil-
ings were not hard. Unfiltered room air was exhausted out-
doors through windows. 
Aggressive infection control measures were evident in
all hospitals. Hand sanitation stations with automated dis-
pensers were abundant, especially on nurses’wards, at ele-
vator landings, and at every hospital entrance. Infection
control staff dispensed sanitizing gels and cloth or dispos-
able hand-cleaning wipes. Infection control personnel
were also stationed at hospital entrances and screened for
fever by measuring forehead skin temperatures. One hos-
pital installed forward-looking infrared scanning cameras
that displayed temperatures on TV monitors next to nurs-
es’ stations. Visitors or staff with fever were denied
entrance and sent to fever clinics outside the hospital for
medical follow-up. Healthcare workers, hospital staff, and
visitors all wore filtering face-piece surgical masks or res-
pirators of varying brands and efficiencies (N95 to N100).
Most hospitals cordoned a gurney pathway from ambu-
lance entrances to an elevator landing, where a designated
and preprogrammed elevator transported SARS patients to
SARS wards. When meetings were conducted, all partici-
pants wore respirators or masks, and handshaking was
minimized or discouraged. 
Appropriate protective equipment (including eye pro-
tection, protective suits, aprons, gloves, head and foot cov-
erings, and respirators) was widely available and
healthcare workers were knowledgeable about their use. In
many nurses’ stations, posters describing standard operat-
ing procedures for SARS protective equipment were pres-
ent. Environmental findings were discussed at a closing
meeting, and written reports were later sent to each hospi-
tal. Table 2 summarizes general environmental aspects of
10 hospitals investigated in southern Taiwan and provides
examples of recommendations provided to these hospitals.
Kaohsiung SARS Screening 
and Observation Facilities
Two proposals for the construction of specialized
SARS screening and isolation facilities in southern Taiwan
were reviewed by NIOSH and Taiwanese environmental
specialists. One proposal considered configuring arrays of
shipping containers (widely available in this port city) into
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Table 2. Environmental findings from southern Taiwan hospitals and medical centers in Kaohsiung, Tainan, and Chia-Yi
a 
Hospital  IRs 
Single pass 
AHU  HEPA  UV 
Pressure 
monitors
b  BP review 
Negative pressure 
in IRs? 
Recommendations 
and notes
 
A   10 (S)  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y 
c 
B  6 (s)  N  N  N  N  Y  N 
d 
C  4 (S) 
2 (s) 
Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
e 
D  3 (S) 
9 (s) 
Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y   
E  29 (s)  Y  N  N  Y  Y  N 
f 
F  2 (S) 
72 (s)
g 
N  N  N  N  Y  N   
G  20  Y  N  N  Y  Y  Y 
h 
H  20  Y  N  N  Y  Y  Y 
i 
I  2 (S) 
20 (s) 
Y  N  N  Y     
j 
J  8 (S) 
19± (S) 
Y  N  N  Y  Y  Y 
k 
aIR, isolation rooms; AHU, air handling units; UV, ultraviolet germicidal irradiation; BP, blueprint or engineering designs plans available for review; S, 
standard isolation room; s, simple isolation room; Y, yes; N, no.  
bPressure monitors were either digital or analog manometers installed outside patient room.
 
cRepair collapsed rooftop exhaust stack. 
dInspect isolation rooms for leakage; four rooms not negatively pressurized. 
eEnsure outdoor air intakes are not in proximity to exhaust fans for simple isolation rooms. 
f32% isolation rooms were not negatively pressurized, no ICU, not recommended for SARS patients. 
gProposed for construction as of 5/2003.  
hVentilation system needs balancing/modification (negative pressure varied from –1.4 to –22 pascal). Extend rooftop exhaust stacks, establish standard 
operating procedures for personal protective equipment use, require handwashing for all hospital contractors. 
iModify 2-way switches in simple isolation rooms so that fans cannot operate in reverse, replace wooden doorknobs with metal on SARS patient ward. 
jModify 2-way switches in simple isolation rooms so that fans cannot operate in reverse, position patient beds with head of bed near source of room 
exhaust for increased isolation, seal wall, window, and ceiling penetrations in simple isolation rooms. 
kModify 2-way switches in simple isolation rooms so that fans cannot operate in reverse, seal windows in simple isolation rooms to enhance negative 
pressure. patient AIIRs linked in hub-and-spoke fashion by a central
nurses’ station. This proposal was not recommended
because of uncontrolled solar loads on the containers and
feasibility issues for patient emergency medical treatment
procedures. The second proposal was to convert vacated
military barracks into a SARS patient–screening facility.
An ambitious timeline required converting an open bay
barracks into 20 individual patient isolation rooms and
ultimately converting another barracks of similar design
for a total of 40 beds. Demolition and reconstruction were
to be completed and a functional facility available within
48 hours. A meeting was held May 22, 2003, to tour the
site, sketch a preliminary design, and provide verbal rec-
ommendations for a proposed redesign of the open bays
into an 18-bed facility, configured into simple patient iso-
lation rooms. Demolition began immediately. The respon-
ders provided a detailed guidance document the following
day, which outlined the following areas: facility design,
construction, and renovation specifications for patient
rooms; ventilation specifications, including hood designs
to improve axial exhaust fans; fire, safety, and environ-
mental guidelines; infection control practices for patients
and healthcare workers; placement of sanitary facilities;
and patient and staff traffic flow through the facility.
This facility was dedicated on May 28, 2003, substan-
tially increasing the number of AIIRs available in southern
Taiwan. The facility could also function as a quarantine
station if needed. The floor plan of this converted barracks
building is shown in Figure 1.
Kaohsiung County, Taidong, Taichung, 
Hualien, and Taipei
The Taiwan DOH issued a directive on April 23, 2003,
mandating the establishment of 11 dedicated SARS hospi-
tals and medical centers geographically dispersed through-
out Taiwan (Table 3). General care hospitals were directed
to treat mild SARS patients (those not on ventilators and
with substantial pulmonary capacity) and patients under-
going rehabilitation; patients who needed ventilation were
sent to medical centers with intensive care units. SARS-
designated hospitals ceased providing general patient care
and began complying with the AIIR construction schedule,
including reengineering or installation of new ventilation
equipment. After the design phase, hospitals completed the
conversion (start of construction to patient acceptance) on
an average of 13 days, resulting in a total of 698 negative-
pressure AIIRs constructed by the completion of the
nationwide project.
From May 31 through June 10, 2003, a total of 11 ded-
icated SARS hospitals were evaluated to assess AIIRs and
wards, infection control practices, healthcare worker and
patient entrance and egress pathways, protective equip-
ment practices, and healthcare worker training (Figure 2).
As part of the arrangement by the Taiwan Center for
Disease Control for the hospital site visits, hospital man-
agement were given a questionnaire that requested design
criteria, number of isolation rooms, personal protective
equipment requirements, and ventilation specifications.
Evaluations began with an opening conference with admin-
istrative, engineering, infection control, and healthcare
worker staff. Hospital objectives and the status of the hos-
pital modifications were discussed, blueprints were
reviewed, ventilation system and AIIR design were dis-
cussed, healthcare worker training was reviewed, and the
personal protective equipment protocol was observed. A
walkthrough of the patient and healthcare worker pathway
was conducted, including an inspection of the various iso-
lation gradients (nurses’ stations, change rooms, isolation
ward corridor, anterooms, and AIIRs). Visible smoke was
used to evaluate the pressurization of AIIRs and to assess
airflow patterns both within the IR and the ventilation
zones and the ventilation system (supply air location,
exhaust discharge, HEPAfilters, and UVGI) was inspected.
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Figure 1. Kaoshsiung SARS fever screening and observation facil-
ity, design layout and staff flow diagram. PPE, personal protective
equipment. From: Recommendations for Design of a SARS
Patient Screening, Isolation and Care Facility. Bloland PB,
Esswein EJ, and Wong W; 5/23/2003.Maintenance practices, establishment of an infection con-
trol department, location of hand-washing stations, room
pressure monitors, and availability of personal protective
equipment were reviewed. Closing meetings were held
with hospital management and healthcare worker staff to
review findings and recommendations and followed up
with written reports.
The Taiwan Industrial Technology Research Institute,
Taiwan IOSH, and Taiwan Center for Disease Control pro-
vided general facility design specifications for these hospi-
tals and other general care facilities treating SARS
patients. Most hospitals contracted with architectural and
engineering firms to manage design and reconstruction. A
national hospital steering committee was formed to guide
this effort. Design criteria included specifications from
existing CDC tuberculosis guidelines (3), the American
Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning
Engineers Design Manual for Hospitals and Clinics (4),
and the American Institute of Architects Guidelines for
Hospitals and Health Care Facilities (5).
Massive infrastructure modifications were necessary to
achieve the desired objectives of increased capacity to
triage and treat seriously ill patients and at the same time
protect healthcare workers. Examples include the reconfig-
uration of the entrance and egress corridors for healthcare
workers and patients to ensure complete physical and air-
flow separation, establish multistep, interlocked ventila-
tion zones for healthcare workers to put on the required
personal protective equipment, as well as a similarly tiered
degowning procedures with final shower-out. Patients
were received in a designated buffer area (in some cases
containing automatic-spray cleaning systems to sanitize
between patients) with dedicated elevators and corridors
for patient flow. All negative-pressure isolation rooms
were designed with single-pass (100% outside air with no
recirculation) dedicated exhaust systems. Exhaust air in all
hospitals was treated with HEPA filtration and UVGI
before discharge. Visual indicators at the IR door and a
remote indicator panel in the nurses’station monitored iso-
lation room pressure. Isolation design included a pressure
gradient from the clean (e.g., nurses’ station or change
room) to the less clean (patient room), including buffer
zones to achieve the desired conditions (Figure 3).
Designated laundry and medical waste corridors were
established, and aggressive cleaning regimens were imple-
mented to ensure frequent sanitation of all areas, including
twice daily cleaning of patient rooms and autoclaving of
waste before its removal from the facility. Personal protec-
tive equipment requirements varied somewhat among hos-
pitals, but typically healthcare workers wore an N95 or
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Table 3. Designated SARS Hospitals, Taiwan
a 
Hospital  Hospital type  Location  Start 2003  Completion 2003  Days  No. isolation rooms 
DSH-1  Referral  Northern Taiwan  5/8  5/19  11  102 Patient rooms 
9 ICU beds 
1 Operation room 
1 Dialysis room 
DSH-2  General care  Northern Taiwan  5/7  5/20  13  92 
DSH-3  General care  Northern Taiwan  5/28  6/30  32  77 Patient rooms (119 beds) 
DSH-4  Referral  Central Taiwan  5/21  6/6  15  40 Patient rooms 
6 ICU beds 
DSH-5  General care  Central Taiwan  5/24  6/7  13  42 
DSH-6  General care  Southern Taiwan  5/24  6/3  9  53 
DSH-7  General care  Southern Taiwan  5/23  6/1  8  83 
DSH-8  Referral  Southern Taiwan  5/22  6/4  12  72 Patient rooms 
6 ICU beds 
1 Operation room 
1 Dialysis room 
DSH-9  General care  Southern Taiwan  5/23  6/6  13  77 
DSH-10  General care  Eastern Taiwan  5/27  6/1  15  28 
DSH-11  General care  Eastern Taiwan  5/27  6/1  4  32 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; DSH, dedicated SARS hospital; ICU, intensive care unit. 
Figure 2. Hospital worker in full personal protective equipment dis-
infects ambulance and hospital at Song Shan Hospital after deliv-
ery of a suspected severe acute respiratory syndrome patient,
June 2003. Photograph courtesy of Max Kiefer, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA.N100 respirator, protective suit, double or triple disposable
gloves, shoe covers, outer gown, hair cover or hood, and
face shield, goggles, or both (Figure 4). To help healthcare
workers alleviate heat stress from the encumbering person-
al protective equipment, work shifts in some hospitals
were reduced to 3 or 4 hours. All hospitals had an estab-
lished infection control department and an infection con-
trol plan. A summary of the key design features of the 11
SARS-dedicated hospitals is listed in Table 4. 
Although the major reconfiguration design goals were
the same for all hospitals, structural realities and other
practical considerations resulted in differences in final
configuration. Design changes during construction were
also necessary to overcome unforeseen engineering obsta-
cles. Examples of differences include the following: 2 of
11 hospitals did not have elevator capability for healthcare
workers to access isolation wards, 5 of 11 hospitals did not
have positive-pressure nurses’ stations in the isolation
ward, not all hospitals had anterooms, and 3 of 11 hospi-
tals did not have complete patient and healthcare worker
pathway separation. Other differences included the num-
ber of UVGI units in the ventilation system, whether the
UVGI was located in front of or behind the HEPA or pre-
filter, the type (electronic or mechanical) and location of
room pressure monitors, the redundancy strategy (dual
exhaust, dual filter, or both), and whether the ventilation
system received testing and balancing after installation.
Conclusions
From a facility, personnel, environmental and occupa-
tional health perspective, the response to SARS in Taiwan
had a profound impact on the healthcare system of the
nation. The Taiwanese government responded in a swift
and comprehensive manner to contain the outbreak.
Although major gaps in knowledge existed regarding this
first emerged infectious disease of the 21st century, deci-
sions involving massive resource commitments had to be
made quickly and decisively. Hospitals and medical cen-
ters islandwide renovated their facilities rapidly or con-
structed new patient treatment facilities to contain and treat
known or suspected SARS patients. Healthcare workers
learned to use personal protective equipment in a far more
judicious and extensive manner than they were accus-
tomed to. Large-scale retraining and reassignment of thou-
sands of healthcare personnel was also required. 
When SARS or a SARS-like pandemic recurs, industri-
al hygiene specialists will be faced with similar circum-
stances and should anticipate that they will be forced to
respond in a highly charged environment of considerable
scientific uncertainty. While the standard industrial
hygiene rubrics of anticipation, recognition, evaluation,
and control remain useful, more inventive approaches to
risk and hazard assessment will be necessary and will test
responders’ capabilities and tenacity. Some of the chal-
lenges these environmental specialists encountered during
the SARS response included the following: developing
expedient guidelines for engineering and administrative
controls for workers and workplaces; developing personal
protective equipment use guidelines for healthcare work-
ers and the general public, including questions regarding
the feasibility of disinfection and reuse and of disposable
respirators; developing and providing training on personal
protective equipment use by workers, especially healthcare
workers; evaluating hospital isolation rooms and ventila-
tion systems, including containment of window air-condi-
tioner condensate from SARS patient rooms; working with
hospital infection control and facilities personnel to devel-
op alternative triage facilities, such as fever screening clin-
ics; advising facilities design personnel on hospital
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Figure 3. Hospital workers in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, listen to a sum-
mary of findings from walkthrough survey and pressurization test-
ing on a severe acute respiratory syndrome patient ward. 
Figure 4. A Center for Disease Control Taiwan investigator is
screened for fever before entering a healthcare facility in
Kaohsiung.  
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.reconfiguration to improve patient transport and patient
isolation; developing, applying, and interpreting results
from unvalidated and novel environmental sampling tech-
niques; creating effective risk communication tools for
workers and the general public; advising local officials on
issues of isolation, quarantine, and other public safety con-
cerns, including obtuse inquiries such as the utility of dis-
infecting septic systems contaminated with SARS-CoV,
and evaluating the feasibility of novel patient containment
and treatment facilities, and the use of unproven, yet theo-
retically reasonable control technologies in an emergency
situation.
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Table 4. Summary of key features of dedicated SARS hospitals
a,b 
Hospital  No. IR/no. PR
c  Work shift  Shower out
d  T&B
e  % compliance
f  No. SARS patients 
DSH-1  102/un  4 h  Y  Un  100  45 
DSH-2  92/210  8 h  Y  Un  100  21 
DSH-3  126/un  ND  Y  Un  40  0 
DSH-4  40/60  4 h  Y  Un  100  0 
DSH-5  42/80  3-2-3 h  Y  Y  95  0 
DSH-6  47/108  4 h  N  Un  60  0 
DSH-7  81/100  4 h  Y  Y  95  0 
DSH-8  72/un  3 h  Y  Un  70  0 
DSH-9  78/un  3 h  Y  Un  90  0 
DSH-10  28/49  3-2-3 h  Y  Un  60  0 
DSH-11  32/100  8 h  Y  Un  100  0 
aAll hospitals had a separate healthcare worker and patient path, single-pass air-handling units that provided 100% outside air with no recirculation, 
HEPA-filtered exhaust systems for the isolation rooms, UV light germicidal irradiation in the exhaust systems, and visible continuous negative pressure 
monitor with alarm that demonstrated the isolation room is operating under negative pressure. 
bSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; DSH, dedicated SARS hospital; un, unknown or unavailable at the time of the investigation; Y, yes; N, no; ND, 
not done. 
cNumber of isolation rooms (IR) constructed and number of patient rooms (PR) previously at the hospital. 
dPersonnel exiting the isolation ward are required to shower as part of the change-out protocol. 
eFacility has completed a test and balance (T&B) (commissioning) of the ventilation system to verify proper function. 
fPercentage of the construction completed. 
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